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MS. BARTLETT:# Good afternoon. 
For those of you who were not here this morning, I am Kathy 
Bartlett.  I am the Symposium Editor of the Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal (IPLJ).  On 
behalf of the entire Journal, I would like to welcome you to our 
third panel discussion and extend my sincere thanks to our 
distinguished guest speakers for being here.  I look forward to what 
I hope will be another lively discussion. 
It is my pleasure to introduce Professor Joel Reidenberg, who 
will be moderating this panel. Professor Reidenberg is a Professor 
of Law at Fordham University School of Law, where he has been 
teaching since 1990.  He has written numerous English and French 
publications on information technology law and policy, and we are 
very grateful for his participation. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you, Kathy. 
Welcome to our panel this afternoon.  I will probably be a 
somewhat less interventionist moderator than my colleague a little 
bit earlier, but I fear I may get drawn into the fray.  Our panel topic 
is essentially—I will use the second phrase of the title—Should the 
First Amendment Ever Come Second?  In looking at the panelists 
who will speak this afternoon and seeing their backgrounds, we 
find a diverse set of issues that this panel can address, ranging 
from filtering to intellectual property concerns. 
I think one common theme among the different topics is the 
confrontation between the First Amendment and an Information 
Society.  If we look at the trend, both in the U.S. as well as 
globally over the past twenty years, we have moved from a 
services to an information-based economy. 
It is in that context that we see the First Amendment.  The First 
Amendment is usually thought of as the quintessential rule for 
 
free speech, privacy and freedom of information on the Internet, and has written several 
law review articles on these issues. 
#  Kathy Bartlett, Symposium Editor, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and 
Entertainment Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law; B.F.A., summa cum 
laude, Jacksonville University, 1981; M.F.A., University of South Florida, 1986; J.D. 
expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003. 
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freedom of speech,1 but it is really about free flows of information 
and regulating—or, rather, not regulating—the flows of 
information.  If the First Amendment is, in effect, a general rule of 
immunity granting unfettered flows of information, we confront 
the problems that are apparent today; essentially, how do we go 
about regulating a society that is information-based?  If the First 
Amendment constrains us in our ability to regulate information 
flows, do we wind up with a society that is lawless and reckless, or 
do we figure out ways in which we can structure information flows 
in society consistent with the First Amendment?  I hope we can 
illuminate these questions today in the context of some specific 
examples. 
The ultimate irony, which I was telling one of the panelists just 
before we started, is the title Should the First Amendment Ever 
Come Second?  I worry at times that if we cannot figure out ways 
of setting boundaries for certain kinds of nefarious activity taking 
place on the Internet, then perhaps the Second Amendment might 
come first.  Think about that. 
This afternoon we have a tremendous group of panelists.  
Seated in front of you are the players in the debate, whether in the 
public policy fora, the courts or the Congress. 
We will start with Ann Beeson, who is the Litigation Director 
of the Technology and Liberty Program at the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU).  Ann has been very active in the field.  
She was the lead counsel in Ashcroft v. ACLU,2 which was the 
challenge to the Child Online Protection Act;3 and counsel for the 
plaintiffs in Reno v. ACLU,4 which is the case that struck down a 
portion of the Communications Decency Act.5  Ann is recognized 
 
1 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628–29 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution is premised upon the theory that the 
marketplace of ideas is the best way to achieve the ultimate truth and that freedom of 
speech must only be limited where there is a “present danger of immediate evil”); 
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (holding that the freedom of speech and 
press clauses of the First Amendment are intended to guard against prior restraints on 
publication). 
2 535 U.S. 564 (2002). 
3 Child Online Protection Act [COPA], 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000). 
4 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
5 Communications Decency Act [CDA], 47 U.S.C. § 223. 
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as one of the Top Fifty Women Litigators in the country by the 
National Law Journal.6  We are delighted to have her start this 
afternoon. 
MS. BEESON: Thanks. 
I just want to talk a little bit about two different lawsuits that I 
am involved in directly at the moment. 
The first one is a constitutional challenge to the Children’s 
Internet Protection Act (CIPA).7  That is the law that actually 
mandates that every public library in the country use Internet filters 
on all of their Internet access computers.8  The name of the case is 
American Library Ass’n v. United States.9 
The other case I want to talk about briefly—and I want to talk 
about how these two cases are related—is one that we recently 
filed in the District of Massachusetts, called Edelman v. N2H2,10 
which involves, in part, a constitutional challenge to provisions of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).11 
I think there are two themes in what I want to say.  First of all, 
one of the themes is to see how it is that restrictions on the use of 
copyrighted works can be used to reinforce, and in some cases to 
justify, censorship in other ways, and, in particular, mandate a 
filtering technology.  The second theme, I think, would be that 
even though all of the proponents of legislation like the DMCA 
have said that the primary purpose of it—and I do believe that their 
 
6 Margaret Cronin Fisk, Women at the Top: Fifty Litigators Who Succeed In and Out 
of the Courthouse, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 17, 2001, at C2. 
7 Children’s Internet Protection Act [CIPA], 47 U.S.C. § 254. 
8 See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(“CIPA requires that libraries, in order to receive [Library Services and Technology Act 
(LSTA)] funds or E-rate discounts, certify that they are using a ‘technology protection 
measure’ that prevents patrons from accessing ‘visual depictions’ that are ‘obscene,’ 
‘child pornography,’ or in the case of minors, ‘harmful to minors.’”) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 
9134(f)(1)(A) (2000) (LSTA); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B), (C) (E-rate)), prob. juris. noted, 
123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) . 
9 Id. 
10 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass. 
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf. 
11 Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA], Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 4001). 
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intention is honorable—is to protect copyright,12 in fact many 
provisions of the law have been very explicitly used to allow 
companies to hide flaws in their technological programs and in 
their work.13  You will see how this plays out again in this 
particular debate. 
I want to first explain, just to give you a sense, because I hope 
at least that there are some students in the room, of just how 
complicated litigation is and how hard it is to develop evidence in 
our cases. 
Some of you may know that before the federal challenge to the 
federal filtering law, there was an earlier challenge to a local policy 
in Loudoun County, Virginia, which required Internet filters on all 
the terminals in the Loudoun County Public Library.14  We were 
also the lawyers in that case.  That was the first time that we had to 
figure out how in the world we were going to prove to the court 
that these filters necessarily blocked access to a wide range of 
valuable speech on the Internet. 
We did it in that case through a range of anecdotal evidence, 
which was not, frankly, very overwhelming.  We were only able to 
come up with anecdotal examples of the kinds of sites that were 
blocked by the programs.15  We won that case and it didn’t go any 
further than the district court.16 
After that case was decided, we began to see that this issue of 
mandated filters in public libraries was going to be a major First 
Amendment issue across the country, because we started seeing 
more and more local libraries decide to filter.  So we embarked on 
 
12 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-190, pt. 1, at 1–2 (1998) (The DMCA “will provide 
certainty for copyright owners and Internet service providers with respect to copyright 
infringement liability online.”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 9 (1998) (“[T]he law must 
adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and exploit 
copyrighted works.”). 
13 See Am. Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], In Legal First, ACLU Sues over New 
Copyright Law, ACLU Archives, at http://archive.aclu.org/issues/cyber/ 
Edelman_N2H2_feature.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
14 Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 
552 (E.D. Va. 1998). 
15 Id. at 557–61. 
16 Id. at 570. 
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a more major project to document how filters were blocking access 
to sites, and particularly in libraries around the country. 
Before the federal filtering law was passed, we were actually 
very close to filing three simultaneous lawsuits against local 
Internet filtering policies in Alaska, Georgia, and Michigan.17  I 
was actually quite disappointed that the CIPA was passed because 
it ruined my vacation to Alaska, which I didn’t get to take because 
we didn’t file the lawsuit. 
We again faced this problem—what are we going to put in as 
expert testimony on over-blocking?  We did a lot of searching 
around.  We found a quite young, but also quite brilliant, 
researcher who is affiliated with the Berkman Center at Harvard.18  
We sat down with him, and we asked what he could do to get us 
much better evidence of just how flawed these programs are. 
The first question that he asked was whether or not he could 
just literally hack into the programs, reverse-engineer the 
programs, and obtain a full copy of the list of sites that the 
products block.  We talked about that in detail.  We realized that if 
he did that, he would almost certainly be liable under the 
provisions of the DMCA that prevent you from circumventing 
access to a technological protection measure, and from creating a 
tool that would help you in that process.19 
And so we decided that we were too busy trying to figure out 
how to litigate mandatory filters to also at that point file a 
challenge to the DMCA, so we put that on a shelf for a little bit.  
We, instead, then came up with a way to document over-blocking 
which involved downloading literally every single site that Yahoo! 
 
17 The ACLU joined with other organizations to bring a lawsuit challenging a Michigan 
statute that added criminal prohibitions against using computers or the Internet to 
disseminate sexually explicit materials to minors. See Cyberspace Communications, Inc. 
v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
18 A complete biography of Ben Edelman and his work with The Berkman Center for 
Internet and Society at Harvard Law School is available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ 
edelman.html. 
19 See 17 U.S.C § 1201(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting circumvention of a “technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title”); id. § 
1201(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting manufacturing or providing any “technology, product, service, 
device, component, or part” designed to circumvent a technological measure that controls 
access to a protected work). 
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and Google had ever indexed, basically the entire index of sites 
from Yahoo! and Google, and running those millions of sites 
through four different major filtering products.20 
It took him many, many, many hours to do this research.  We 
had to pay him a lot of money to do it.  He actually made, I think, 
significantly more money than I did as a lawyer for the ACLU, and 
he hadn’t even gotten his college diploma yet—which our friends 
at the Justice Department made a big deal out of in the trial court, 
and which actually backfired.  Too bad you weren’t there, Jake. 
You would have been amused by it. 
MR. LEWIS: I’m not the trial attorney. 
MS. BEESON: No, he’s not. 
Anyway, Ben’s research, of course, still did not by any means 
document every single site that this product wrongly blocks, for a 
whole number of reasons that are discussed in the opinion of the 
three-judge court that heard the case,21 which of course includes 
the fact that the search engines do not even begin to reach all of the 
sites on the Internet. 
Because he had to come up with some assumptions about how 
to determine when a site was wrongly blocked, his definition was 
that the site was wrongly blocked if Yahoo! categorized it as a 
government site and N2H2 categorized it as pornography.  That 
was a sign that something was wrong and that one of the two 
classification systems had wrongly categorized it. 
He came up with over 4,000 sites, which we submitted on CD-
ROM to the court,22 that were very clearly improperly classified.  
You know, this is always the most enjoyable part of these talks.  I 
can never resist the urge to give a couple of examples.  There are 
many, many, but some of them are just such fun. 
 
20 See Expert Report of Benjamin Edelman, Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United 
States, (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 01-CV-1322), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/ 
pubs/aclu-101501.pdf.  Edelman investigated four major filtering products, SurfControl 
Cyber Patrol 6, N2H2 Internet Filtering 2.0, Secure Computing SmartFilter 3.0, and 
Websense Enterprise 4.3. See id. 
21 See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 427–31, 446–47 (E.D. 
Pa. 2002), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). 
22 See id. at 442–43; Expert Report of Edelman at 23–26, Multnomah County Pub. 
Library (No. 01-CV-1322). 
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Orphanage Emmanuel,23 which is a Christian orphanage in 
Honduras, was blocked by Cyber Patrol as “adult sexually 
explicit.”  The home page of a Buddhist nun was categorized as 
nudity by N2H2.24  A Danish anti-death penalty site categorized as 
pornography—I think that’s kind of funny, because if it had been a 
pro-death penalty site, I, as an ACLU lawyer, might have 
categorized that as pornography, but an anti-death penalty site, 
hard to see.25  The Sydney University Australian football team—
now who knows what was really there, but SmartFilter categorized 
it as sex.26  Anyway, the list goes on and on, as I say, there are lots 
of examples. 
Again, though, this is not at all quantitative research.  It does 
not show what percentage of the time, for example, these products 
improperly classify things.  For that reason, Ben’s research was 
ongoing, even after we finished the evidence and the filtering case 
was decided.  He is currently looking into how foreign 
governments are using filters to block access specifically to 
political sites and to anti-religious sites in some cases.  For that 
reason, even after we won the filtering case at the district court 
level, he wanted to go on with his research. 
He came back to us and asked if we would represent him in a 
challenge to N2H2.  He wanted to obtain a copy of their full list.  
But if he did that, he may be liable under the DMCA.  And so we 
filed the suit in Massachusetts.27 
Just to wind up, before I go on to the N2H2 suit, what 
happened in the filtering case, was the court found that the 
evidence showed that the products in evidence blocked a wide 
range of protected speech.28  The court also found that was 
inevitable because the very nature of these software programs was 
such that they could never become perfect enough to distinguish 
between what is protected speech and what is unprotected 
 
23 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 446–47. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. 
Mass. filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf. 
28 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 446–49. 
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speech.29  The case is now in front of the Supreme Court, which 
will probably decide next week whether or not it will take 
jurisdiction over the case.30  It is widely expected that it will, so it 
will probably be heard sometime in the spring. 
In July we filed a lawsuit against N2H2.31  That lawsuit asks 
for a couple of things.  It is a declaratory judgment action.  It asks 
the court, first, to interpret provisions of the DMCA to have some 
kind of fair use exception, which is not at all clear from any of the 
earlier case law on the DMCA; and find, in particular, that Ben’s 
reverse-engineering of the N2H2 program would be 
constitutionally protected fair use.32 
It also asks to declare the N2H2 licensing agreement to be 
unenforceable.33  That is another very interesting, separate issue, 
which has serious First Amendment implications, because of 
course the N2H2 license specifically prohibits Ben, the computer 
researcher, from reverse-engineering the program.34  That is 
becoming a very common way that owners of software programs 
try to extend their property rights much further than the law itself 
would normally allow. 
I think I am going to stop there, because I know I am going 
over, and I am sure you will have a lot of questions. 
But again, the relationship between these two cases just shows 
that, first of all, with respect to the DMCA, it is not just kids 
wanting access to DVDs that is at issue.  The issue is whether or 
not very serious computer researchers can investigate, and analyze 
and publish, their research documenting flaws in programs that the 
public has a very strong concern in learning the accuracy of. 
That’s all. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you. 
 
29 See id at 410. 
30 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (noting probable 
jurisdiction). 
31 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman (No. 02-CV-11503) 
32 See id. at 27. 
33 See id. at 27–28. 
34 See id. at 20. 
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This shows, I think, a very interesting area of linkage related to 
some of the open questions with the DMCA. 
Edelman had not yet been challenged, had he? 
MS. BEESON: What do you mean?  Had they threatened to 
sue him? 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Right. 
MS. BEESON: They had done several things, which I didn’t 
get into.  It is very clear that N2H2 intends to enforce its property 
rights against him, and they have said that in their latest 10-Q.35  I 
was going to read the language.  It actually says in their latest 
filing with the SEC that they intend to assert all of their legal rights 
against Edelman if he violates the agreement or their proprietary 
rights.36 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: That’s under a licensing 
agreement, but not under the DMCA. 
MS. BEESON: No, no.  Under both.  Under every single— 
MR. SIMS: But none of that is a threat to sue under the 
DMCA. 
MS. BEESON: Well, they make it quite clear that they will use 
all available legal remedies, not just the licensing agreement. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: The DMCA, though, has two 
interesting exemptions from the anti-circumvention provision.  
One is that it is permissible to hack to disable software that is 
trying to collect personal information.37  The other is the 
exemption for trying to discover what the list is of blocked web 
 
35 See N2H2, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for Quarter Ending June 30, 2002 (“We intend to 
defend the validity of our license agreement and to enforce the provisions of this 
agreement to protect our proprietary rights.  We also intend to assert all of our legal rights 
against Mr. Edelman if he engages in future activity that violates the agreement or our 
proprietary rights.”), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1077301/ 
000089102002001251/v83748e10vq.htm. 
36 See id. 
37 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(i) (2000) (permitting circumvention where the technological 
measure is capable of “collecting or disseminating personally identifying 
information . . .”). 
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sites in filtering programs.38  In essence, the DMCA, which was 
designed for intellectual property protection, now confronts 
privacy issues and creates exceptions.  The scope of these 
exceptions is going to be very important for someone like 
Edelman, trying to put together these lists of blocked programs. 
You can also ask the question, if only these 4,000 obscure sites 
were identified as being blocked, how significant is that blocking?  
How significant a censorship is that, compared to the harm that 
might be sought in avoidance by the mandate that filtering be 
imposed? 
We will turn now to Jacob Lewis, who might have a different 
view of filtering.  Mr. Lewis is the Appellate Litigation Counsel in 
the Civil Division at the Department of Justice.  He is a graduate of 
Harvard College and Harvard Law School, but we won’t hold that 
against him.  He has defended the constitutionality of the Child 
Online Protection Act and was one of the attorneys involved in the 
defense of the Children’s Internet Protection Act.39 
MR. LEWIS: Thank you. 
Before I say anything, because David Carson went through this 
process earlier, these are my own views.  I have to give the 
standard disclaimer.  When the Justice Department makes a filing 
in court, it really is an enormous institutional process.  The 
language that is in our briefs, and in this case the jurisdictional 
statements, say, in the American Library Association case, is the 
product of a number of minds, many of which are greater than 
mine, that actually come up with the government’s position.40  So 
anything I say that is different from those filings should not be held 
against the government in a later filing as a “gotcha!”  Obviously, I 
have a fair amount of background and thinking on these kinds of 
issues, and I hope to give you the benefit of that, but to the extent 
that, either advertently or inadvertently, I diverge from the 
 
38 See id. § 1201(g) (permitting circumvention to conduct “good faith encryption 
research . . .”). 
39 Mr. Lewis was a member of the litigation team that defended the CIPA from the 
ACLU’s contention that it violated free speech guarantees. See ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 
162 (3d Cir. 2000). 
40 See Brief for the United States, United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d 
401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (No. 02-361), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). 
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government’s position, you should not confuse my statements with 
the statements that the government has made in cases that have, 
are, or will be in litigation. 
To go back to the point of the 4,000 sites, that really is an 
extremely important question.  I think that Ben Edelman’s universe 
of sites that he ran through to get the 4,000 was about 500,000. 
But the point is that the Internet contains a vast number of web 
sites.  The three-judge district court in the American Library case 
estimated one or two billion web pages, billions of unique web 
sites.41  So it may be all too easy to find even thousands of sites 
where it clearly seems that the blocking is off the wall.  I am not 
saying that any of the ones on the list are off the wall.  There may 
be justifications for them. 
But assume for the moment that there were 4,000, and with 
diligence you could find even a few more thousand. In the context 
of the web, with millions and billions of web pages, that by itself 
would not tell you that there is a significant amount of over-
blocking going on.  In the context of this kind of lawsuit, which is 
a facial challenge to the statute before it has been enforced without 
any particulars, it does not tell you that, in the words of the legal 
standard, that the statute is substantially overbroad. 
One of the problems with any of this kind of litigation 
involving the Internet is the Internet is so vast that numbers which 
in isolation appear to be large may not be large when compared 
against the world of the Internet. 
Second, Ann talks about the Children’s Internet Protection Act 
as “mandating” filtering in public libraries.  But the Act is actually 
a condition of federal funding.42  The public libraries are free not 
to take the funds that are under the particular federal programs.  In 
fact, I am not quite sure of the exact figures, but my understanding 
 
41 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (stating that “a figure of 2 billion is a 
reasonable estimate of the number of Web pages that can be reached . . . by standard 
search engines”), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). 
42 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(A)(i) (2000) (describing the “[r]equirements for certain 
libraries with computers having Internet access”). 
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is that federal funding as a percentage of total funding of public 
libraries is quite a small amount.43 
In any event, the freedom is there.  If any particular public 
library does not like the condition on the statutory programs that 
provide funding for Internet-connected computers they do not have 
to take the money.  The condition then goes away, it is irrelevant 
so far as they are concerned. 
I can’t really speak to the N2H2 litigation.  I know there is a 
challenge lurking somewhere in there to the constitutionality of the 
DMCA.  If that ripens, probably a trial branch at the Justice 
Department will be getting involved, since the Department of 
Justice defends the constitutionality of federal enactments. 
I am grateful to be an appellate attorney.  I only do courts of 
appeals cases, so I get to either ride the momentum of a case that 
goes well; or on occasion, maybe more than one occasion, pick up 
the pieces, or try to pick up the pieces, after they have all fallen 
apart below.  In any case, there will be some time before the N2H2 
case would even come up to my office. 
On the other hand, the CIPA litigation has been through my 
office and now the government’s appeal is before the Supreme 
Court.44  My understanding is the Court was scheduled to consider 
whether they would take the case today.  Since the other parties to 
the case have not really opposed the Court granting review, I 
would be very surprised if the Court didn’t grant review.45 
To my mind, the interesting thing about the library filtering 
case, the CIPA litigation, is less the nuances of public forum 
doctrine or the particulars of the blocking software, but the fact 
that the case may actually turn to a large extent on what one views 
as the nature and role of a public library. 
 
43 See, e.g., Betsy Sywetz, Public Testimony Submitted for Spring 1999 Hearings by 
the Regents Commission on Library Services, Huntington Station, N.Y., at 
http://www.nysl.nysed.gov/rcols/tst-li.htm (May 19, 1999) (wherein New York’s Deputy 
Director of the Office of Library Services notes that “Library service is generally 
considered a local responsibility in the United States. . . .  In New York State about 10% 
of library funding comes from the State and less than 2% from the federal government.”). 
44 See Am. Library Ass’n, 123 S. Ct. at 551 (noting probable jurisdiction). 
45 See id. 
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The district court ultimately determined that the standard by 
which it was supposed to evaluate filtering’s effectiveness or these 
technology protection measures that the statute requires is strict 
scrutiny.46  In doing so, the court considered the public libraries’ 
connections to the Internet to be a public forum—a limited public 
forum but a public forum nonetheless, and for various reasons the 
court found strict scrutiny applied.47 
But the district court acknowledged that it would not apply 
strict scrutiny to a library’s traditional collection development 
decisions.48  That is, public libraries—all libraries—have finite 
budgets.  They cannot buy or store every book, magazine, print, or 
video that is created in the world, so they have to make decisions 
about what to acquire, and indeed what to retain.  So in the district 
court’s view, the library must necessarily make a choice as to 
whether to purchase, for example, books on gardening or books on 
golf.49 
At a later point, the district court wrote that with its “last $100” 
a library could decide to buy “the complete works of Shakespeare” 
rather than “the complete works of John Grisham”50—although in 
the public library area it is usually the other way around.  The 
district court found that that kind of decision was subject to 
rational basis review and did not really pose a First Amendment 
problem.51 
But when we look at library collection development decisions, 
common sense tells us that public librarians often make all sorts of 
decisions about what books to acquire on the basis of their content.  
 
46 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (The “Internet . . . presents unique 
possibilities for promoting First Amendment values . . . [which,] in the context of the 
provision of Internet access in public libraries, justify the application of heightened 
scrutiny to content-based restrictions that might be subject to only rational review in 
other contexts . . . .”). 
47 See id. at 457 (“We are satisfied that when the government provides Internet access 
in a public library, it has created a designated public forum.”). 
48 See id. at 462 (“[W]e agree with the government that generally the First Amendment 
subjects libraries’ content-based decisions about which print materials to acquire for their 
collections to only rational review.”). 
49 See id. at 408–09. 
50 Id. at 462. 
51 See id. 
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The librarian can decide that a certain book is not as good as 
another book, or that it is just plain wrong.  Nothing in the First 
Amendment requires a library to buy a book on alchemy or 
extrasensory perception or that would demean persons because of 
their race or ethnicity or religion.  A librarian may choose to 
acquire such a book, but the First Amendment would not require 
the library to do so. 
That traditional judgment is exercised where sexually explicit 
materials are concerned.  In the record in the case, the district court 
acknowledged that very few public libraries collect the graphic 
sexually explicit materials, such as XXX-rated videos or Hustler 
magazine.52  The district court noted that, according to the OCLC 
database, which is a database of 48,000 libraries worldwide, only 
400 in the database, of all types of libraries everywhere in the 
database, wherever they are located, even outside the country, only 
400 were listed as carrying a subscription to Playboy magazine and 
only eight to Hustler.53  So clearly, with regard to this what I 
would call the off-line collection, the traditional print magazine 
collection, there is this kind of entirely appropriate content-based 
judgment going on. 
The rules should be no different, it seems to me, where the 
connection to the Internet is concerned.  A library connects to the 
Internet for the same reasons that it buys traditional materials, in 
order to expand its collection.  The fact that the library by 
connecting to the Internet thereby has the potential to connect to all 
of the Internet does not mean it has to connect to all of the Internet. 
The fact is there are a limited number of terminals, there is a 
limited amount of time, even with regard to an Internet connection.  
Many libraries, if you go to the public library, may have a sign-up 
sheet saying thirty minutes for time at the computer.  There may be 
a line of people waiting.54 
 
52 See id. at 420. 
53 See id. at 420 n.4. 
54 The district court observed that: 
Nearly every librarian who testified at trial stated that patrons’ demand for 
Internet access exceeds the library’s supply of Internet terminals.  Under such 
circumstances, every time library patrons visit a Web site, they deny other 
patrons waiting to use the terminal access to other Web sites.  Just as the 
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The record showed that libraries had dealt with that kind of 
scarcity by, among other things, for example, excluding game 
playing or banning email or access to chat rooms, in order to 
presumably promote the most efficient use of terminals.55  
Someone who is waiting to do research on a medical condition, for 
example, is not going to be particularly happy if they are not able 
to get to that computer before closing time because there is some 
other patron who is engaged in extended email conversation, or is 
looking up a fantasy football league, or whatever it might be. 
The district court’s assumption was that the First Amendment 
prohibits a library from making any kind of restriction on Internet 
access.56  But just as the library can exercise traditional collection 
judgment with regard to regular printed materials, it should be able 
to do so with regard to sexually explicit materials on the Internet. 
So when you look at what CIPA does, it encourages libraries to 
exercise their judgment in a particular way—in other words, to 
employ a technology protection device that would exclude child 
pornography and obscenity, which are unprotected by the First 
Amendment, and harmful-to-minors material so far as minors are 
concerned. 
The district court would have said that the libraries did not 
have an ability to exercise that judgment to exclude that speech, 
and so therefore the statute is unconstitutional because it is paying 
libraries, in essence, to do something unconstitutional. 
That meant, by the way, that the seven percent of libraries that 
the district court found already employed filtering even before the 
CIPA, were doing something that was presumably violating the 
First Amendment.57 
 
scarcity of a library’s budget and shelf space constrains a library’s ability to 
provide its patrons with unrestricted access to print materials, the scarcity of 
time at Internet terminals constrains libraries’ ability to provide patrons with 
unrestricted Internet access . . . . 
Id. at 465 n.25. 
55 See id. at 422 (noting that the Fulton County Public Library “restricts access to the 
Web sites of dating services” and the Tacoma Public Library “does not allow patrons to 
use the library’s Internet terminals for personal email, for online chat, or for playing 
games”). 
56 See id. at 411. 
57 See id. at 406. 
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The district court also stated that filtering was a problem 
because it involved connecting to the Internet and then excluding 
various things.58  In contrast, in the district court’s view, with a 
traditional library collection, a book comes in, you look at the 
book, you see whether the book is okay, and then you either 
acquire it or not.59 
But that is not actually how things work even in the traditional 
world.  There are plenty of instances in which a librarian does not 
review a book before it has been acquired.  Indeed librarians 
cannot physically read or review all the materials that come into 
the library before the fact.  Librarians have necessarily relied on 
bibliographies and finding aids and book reviews—many of the 
same kinds of things you might rely on in deciding whether to buy 
a book in a bookstore.60 
But public libraries also employ what are called approval plans, 
in which a library signs up with a publisher or a wholesaler and 
says, look, give us everything that comes in that you think is the 
kind of stuff we collect.  They might even give them some specific 
instructions about the kinds of things they collect.  And if they 
have a problem with what comes in after they have looked at it, 
they will send the material back.61 
They might, for example, say John Grisham is absolute gold.  
If he writes another book, we are taking whatever it is.  And they 
do not have to read the next Grisham in order to determine that it is 
appropriate for the library.  In fact, that book might never be 
touched by human hands until the patron first takes it out. 
By the same token, a library that receives a bequest of 5,000 
books, say, even if they had the space on the shelves for it, is not 
required to keep all those 5,000 books in its collection just because 
they are free and they have space.  The librarian can go through the 
 
58 See id. at 421. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. (noting that “many librarians use selection aids, such as review journals and 
bibliographies, as a guide to the quality of potential acquisitions”). 
61 See id. (referring to the “use of third-party vendors or approval plans to acquire print 
and video resources” and explaining that in “such arrangements third party vendors 
provide materials based on the library’s description of its collection development 
criteria”). 
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books and decide which ones they want to take and, for example, 
not to take the ones that may be sexually explicit. 
The important point is that the library in all such cases 
exercises judgment.  The district court seemed to suggest that the 
First Amendment prevented the library from having any judgment 
in this area.62  But in fact this kind of judgment has traditionally 
been employed by librarians to further First Amendment purposes. 
Libraries are not just warehouses, they are places of guidance.  
Libraries collect books so that you can go to the best book for your 
purposes in the quickest way.  Librarians can make the judgment 
that there are certain types of books, certain kinds of books, that do 
not further their purposes as well as other kinds of books. 
That is the main point, maybe the most interesting point, and to 
a large extent a non-legal point.  In the end, the American Library 
case may turn as much on a perception of matters outside legal 
doctrine as it does on the nuances of the legal concepts that are at 
issue. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you.  Very interesting 
presentation. 
In the comments that Ann and Jake have suggested to us, it 
sounds like the case is turning in part on the quality of the 
technology, and on the court’s understanding of what the 
technology was and how it functioned.  At the district level, the 
court did not see connecting to the Internet as analogous to the 
acquisitions decisions that a librarian traditionally makes.63  All of 
 
62 See id. at 464–65. 
While the First Amendment permits the government to exercise editorial 
discretion in singling out particularly favored speech for subsidization or 
inclusion in a state-covered forum, we believe that where the state provides 
access to a ‘vast democratic forum’ . . . and then selectively excludes from the 
forum certain speech on the basis of its content, such exclusions are subject to 
strict scrutiny. 
Id. 
63 See id. at 462.  The court found that the “central difference” between the use of 
Internet filters and the editorial discretion exercised in choosing books for the library’s 
collection is that 
by providing patrons with even filtered Internet access, the library permits 
patrons to receive speech on a virtually unlimited number of topics, from a 
virtually unlimited number of speakers without attempting to restrict patrons’ 
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a sudden, the library did not need to make acquisition decisions 
anymore. 
If the technology blocked a couple of sites inaccurately 
because the technology was not that refined, then it is the law that 
is wrong, rather than the technology that needs to be fixed. 
We may hear more about this relationship between the law’s 
dictates and the technology’s capability coming from our next 
speaker. 
He is Lee Tien, the Senior Staff Attorney at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation (EFF).64  He specializes in the law and policy 
of free speech and privacy.  He served his undergraduate time at 
Stanford and then at Boalt, where he received his law degree.  He 
has published on and litigated cases involving free speech and 
Internet speech. 
MR. TIEN: Thank you very much. 
My talk today is going to be only obliquely related to the 
previous speakers’ presentations. 
When I looked at this subject, I thought: There isn’t a whole 
hell of a lot that I could say about censorware or filtering that Ann 
and Jake couldn’t talk about.  So I am going to take a different 
approach to the issue of the Internet and speech. 
Eventually, this PowerPoint presentation will come up, but I 
will go ahead and start, rather than wait until it does. 
I have titled this talk Sex, Science, Harm, and the Internet.  I 
chose this very general idea to think about the different kinds of 
harms that are associated with speech and our conceptions of or 
assumptions about those harms. 
Let’s start with the censorware example.  You’ve got a kind of 
harm there.  In the white paper that EFF did for the National 
 
access to speech that the library, in the exercise of its professional judgment, 
determines to be particularly valuable. 
Id. 
64 The Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF] is a donor-supported membership 
organization dedicated to protecting digital rights. See http://www.eff.org (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2003). 
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Academy of Sciences,65 we argued that one of the bases for 
censorware or for blocking software is the notion that sexual 
images are “toxic material,” that simple exposure to sexual images 
was in itself harmful.66  This is one of the basic paradigms of First 
Amendment harm. 
[Slide]  Voila!  Thank you. 
Here, for instance, is a quote from the American Family Online 
page, which sums up this idea of toxicity.67  So we have this idea 
of exposure as harm. 
[Slide] As we know from looking at the censorware cases, 
censorware blocks a lot of other material.  Here are some examples 
that were called out in the CIPA decision.68 
I think it is no surprise that when Ann constructed this case, 
she made some very careful choices about who the plaintiffs would 
be.  Among these web and patron plaintiffs were people who were 
either focused on disseminating or accessing scientific information, 
such as about breast cancer, reconstructive breast surgery, that sort 
of thing.  So in this particular area, at least, we see a notion that the 
scientific value of information acts almost as a trump, that is, there 
is a high value to scientific speech. 
[Slide]  But in the First Amendment area, that is not the way 
that science is uniformly looked at and exposure is not the only 
kind of harm we deal with. 
In the area of national security harm, harm is not due to “toxic” 
exposure.  It is a different kind of harm.  For instance, simply 
publishing the sailing dates of transports or the number and 
 
65 EFF’s white paper was submitted as part of a congressionally commissioned study 
on Tools and Strategies for Protecting Kids from Pornography and Their Applicability to 
Other Inappropriate Internet Content performed by the National Research Council, a 
division of the National Academy of Sciences.  The study was eventually published as 
YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE INTERNET (Dick Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., 
2002), available at http://bob.nap.edu/html/youth_internet. 
66 Id. 
67 “CAUTION . . . Pornography is dangerous, and viewing it (even for a moment) can 
set off a terrible chain of events.”  American Family Online, Help Desk,  at 
http://www.afo.net/help/filter.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2003). 
68 Examples included information about breast cancer, sexually transmitted diseases, 
and health/medical information about sex. See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 
446–47. 
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location of troops does not necessarily cause harm to those 
exposed.69  The problem is that it reveals information that someone 
might use to prevent something from happening. 
Similarly, in the Bernstein case,70 which involved scientific 
“exports” (publication) of encryption software, the government 
was not claiming that encryption software was like a virus, that it 
would directly cause harm, that the speech itself would in some 
way be harmful; rather, the claim was that someone could use 
encryption overseas in a way that was detrimental to the U.S. 
interest.71 
Now, the government argued that software was not really 
speech.  EFF argued that there was a very strong communicative 
aspect to programs.  So there again, we used the notion of science 
as high-value speech to frame the publication of source code, 
helped by the fact that our client, Professor Bernstein, was first a 
graduate student and then a professor.72 
[Slide]  But now let’s turn to some of the other types of harm.  
Another example, economic harm, is exemplified by the DMCA.73  
Copyright law has always restricted some speech in order to 
protect the economic interests of copyright holders.  The DMCA 
was enacted to strengthen that protection.  Now, the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA,74 which are at issue in the 
Edelman75 case and also in a case that EFF litigated last year, the 
Felten76 case, raise some serious questions of restrictions on 
scientific speech. 
 
69 See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (finding that “no one 
would question but that a government might prevent . . . publication of the sailing dates 
of transports or the number and location of troops”). 
70 Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), withdrawn, reh’g 
granted, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
71 See Near, 283 U.S. at 716. 
72 See Bernstein, 176 F.3d at 1135. 
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000). 
74 See id. §§ 1201–1205. 
75 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass. 
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf. 
76 Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. dismissed Nov. 
28, 2001). See EFF, Frequently Asked Questions About Felten & USENIX v. RIAA 
Legal Case, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/faq_felten.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2003) (giving background information about Felten). 
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The technology anti-trafficking provisions not only make it 
unlawful to disseminate technologies of circumvention, but they 
also have very limited exceptions that actually curtail existing law 
permitting reverse-engineering, such as under the Sega v. Accolade 
fair use decision.77 
So one of the questions we had in the Felten case, which we 
hoped would be elucidated, was whether the Section 1201 
provisions against technology should be read to include scientific 
papers like that published by Professor Felten.78 
Now, Professor Felten’s paper was based on something called 
the SDMI Challenge.79  He and his research team looked at how 
various watermarking and other related technologies of the music 
industry could be defeated or beaten.  This was part of a contest 
where the recording industry actually invited people to go ahead 
and do this kind of research, so there was no issue as to the legality 
of the research team’s investigations.  On the other hand, there 
were questions as to whether or not he could publish the team’s 
research results. 
This case was ultimately dismissed on justiciability grounds, 
largely because the recording industry, which had originally 
threatened Professor Felten and his research team with a lawsuit if 
they published the paper, ended up agreeing to permit the 
publication of the paper.80  And so the threat was, as far as the 
district court was concerned, withdrawn.81 
[Slide]  Now the last set of examples I want to examine has to 
do with science and the post-9/11 era.  We are seeing, obviously, a 
lot of restrictions on scientific speech.  This is not a topic that has 
 
77 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
78 See Felten, No. CV-01-2669. 
79 The Secure Digital Music Initiative [SDMI] challenge was a contest set up by the 
recording industry under the auspices of the Recording Industry Association of America 
[RIAA], which asked “hackers” to circumvent a number of digital music security 
technologies. See Cassandra Imfeld, Playing Fair with Fair Use? The Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s Impact on Encryption Researchers and Academicians, 8 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 111, 136–38 (2003). 
80 See Transcript of Motions Before Honorable Garrett E. Brown, United States District 
Court Judge, Nov. 28, 2001, Felten (No. No. CV-01-2669), http://www.eff.org/IP/ 
DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_transcript.pdf. 
81 See id. 
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gotten a lot of public press, although certainly the New York Times 
has been covering this.82  But there is simply a lot of activity going 
on in the higher levels of government and in academia that all 
revolve around the question of how much of this stuff that you 
ordinarily published in scientific journals really needs to be out 
there83 
MIT, for instance, has gone on record saying (in essence) that 
they have been approached by many government contracting 
officers to include provisions in R&D funding contracts that would 
give government officials the power to decide that certain 
information in the research was sensitive and could not be 
disclosed.  They are not going to accept that.84 
 
82 See, e.g., William J. Broad, U.S. Is Tightening Rules on Keeping Scientific Secrets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, § 1, at 1. 
83 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Judith Miller, Many Worry About Germ Attack, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at A16 (noting that “a deep philosophical divide has emerged 
between scientists and intelligence officials over whether to withhold scientific 
information in the name of national security”). 
84 See Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and 
Security: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, H.R. REP. NO. 107-809 (2002) 
(testimony of Sheila Widnall, Institute Professor and Professor of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology).  Dr. Widnall explained that MIT 
recommended 
because there is no consistent understanding or definition of what would 
constitute ‘sensitive’ information, MIT should continue its policy of not 
agreeing to any sponsor’s contractual request that research results generated 
during the course of a program be reviewed for the inadvertent disclosure of 
‘sensitive’ information.  Increasingly, MIT has seen the attempt by government 
contracting officials to include a requirement that research results be reviewed, 
prior to publication, for the potential disclosure of ‘sensitive’ information. Such 
a request implies potential restrictions on the manner in which research results 
are handled and disseminated, and may also restrict the personnel who have 
access to this material.  The difficulty with this approach is that the term 
‘sensitive’ has not been defined, and the obligations of the Institute and the 
individuals involved have not been clarified nor bounded. This situation opens 
the Institute and its faculty, students, and staff to potential arbitrary dictates 
from individual government contract monitors-however well intended.  To 
date, MIT has refused, in all cases, to accept this restriction in any of its 
government contracts. 
Sheila Widnall, Testimony Before the House Committee on Science, House Committee on 
Science Hearings, at www.house.gov/science/hearings/full02/oct10/widnall.htm (Oct. 10, 
2002). 
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This question of scientific openness and national security is not 
new.  After the Corson Report85 during the Reagan Administration, 
a simple principle was articulated—that research will either be 
classified, in which case it is going to be done very, very tightly; or 
it is going to be open, unclassified.  The thought was we needed a 
bright line, because having an in-between line of “sensitive but 
unclassified” would make it very hard for scientists to do their 
work. 
The University of Illinois-Chicago recently held a conference 
that included a panel featuring Abigail Salyers, past president of 
the American Society of Microbiology (ASM), and she confirmed 
that there has been an incredible amount of pressure from the 
government, as to what should or should not be able to publish in 
an open peer-reviewed scientific journal.86  The pressure has also 
been internal, because these scientists think very much about the 
public interest and about the scientific ethics of what they do.87  
There is definitely a great deal of concern about there being too 
much interference with the scientific process.88 
[Slide]  I bring up these examples because I think that they tie 
in with the general questions of what is science and what kinds of 
harms are we really going to focus on in the First Amendment 
area. 
The normal speech rules would tend to say that you cannot 
restrict this kind of speech.  The Pentagon Papers standard for 
prior restraints,89 the Brandenburg advocacy test,90 Florida Star,91 
 
85 NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ET AL., SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY (1982), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309033322/html/. 
86 See Diana Jean Schemo, Scientists Discuss Balance of Research and Security, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at A12. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the newspaper could not be enjoined from publishing highly sensitive and 
possibly unlawfully obtained government documents unless disclosure “will surely result 
in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”). 
90 Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444–47 (1969) (finding advocacy of unlawful 
conduct is protected speech unless “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action”). 
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and other related cases92 say that information once in the public 
domain cannot be restricted. 
[Slide] But today we have a very different kind of ethos, at 
least in some circles, which is that the science is going to be 
misused.93  I think it is important to see here that one reason why 
we have this concern about speech and harm is the presence of the 
Internet. 
[Slide]  Now, the problem that the Internet poses for all of this 
is that you no longer have the sort of presumption of limited 
dissemination that we had in the old days. 
[Slide]  We see this problem in the privacy area as well.  We 
were happy to allow all sorts of information to be treated as public 
records because it was locked up in a dusty file cabinet 
somewhere.94  Now that public records are being put online, we are 
starting to reevaluate. whether we should we do that.  Did we 
really mean to say that this—maybe a Social Security number, 
some other information—ought to be public?  The Internet is 
causing us to redefine what a public record is. 
What I want to suggest is that we are seeing in the area of First 
Amendment law the Internet having the potential to redefine what 
 
91 Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (finding First Amendment prevents 
sanction for publishing truthful, lawfully acquired information of public significance, 
absent a state interest of the highest order). 
92 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (finding “if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state 
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . 
of the highest order”). 
93 See Ronald M. Atlas, Bioterrorism: The ASM Response, ASM News, at 
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/feature1.htm (last modified June 10, 2002) (“[B]ioethicist 
Arthur Caplan from the University of Pennsylvania is widely quoted as saying, ‘We have 
to get away from the ethos that knowledge is good, knowledge should be publicly 
available, that information will liberate us. . . . Information will kill us in the techno-
terrorist age, and I think it’s nuts to put that stuff on Web sites.’”). See also United States 
v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (holding that publication of how 
to build a hydrogen bomb could be used against the United States by its enemies in a 
nuclear war and, therefore, restraint on publication is valid). 
94 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (“[P]lainly there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local 
police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.”). 
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is permissible within the Brandenburg95 framework.  
Brandenburg’s relevance here, as a doctrinal matter, lies in its 
setting a minimum standard for punishing speech based on its 
“tendency” to cause harmful action by a reader or listener.96 
[Slide]  Now, as for advocacy and abstract teaching, if you are 
familiar with the old cases—Noto97 and Yates,98 involving the 
Smith Act and Communist membership—these are concepts that 
the Supreme Court came up with to try to distinguish between 
what was permissible and what was not.  It was ultimately all 
subsumed into Brandenburg.99 
William Wiecek wrote a very nice article in the Supreme Court 
Review about a year ago talking about the legal foundations of 
American anti-Communism.100  Wiecek argues that part of what 
made the anti-Communist hysteria so powerful was that the 
U.S.S.R. and its creation of the Comintern101 put into place 
something that policymakers in the United States and in other 
countries could look at as a covert network, an apparatus devoted 
to the spreading of bad information.102 
 
95 395 U.S. at 444. 
96 See Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 19 (2002) (“[B]y 
logical implication [Brandenburg] creates a threshold that must be satisfied in every 
instance in which governmentally controlled sanctions are sought to be placed upon the 
exercise of speech perceived as likely to inspire illegal or dangerous behavior on the part 
of a listener, regardless of the intent of the speaker.”). 
97 Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961) (“[T]he mere abstract 
teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and 
violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such 
action”). 
98 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324–25 (1957) (distinguishing advocacy of 
action from advocacy of belief). 
99 395 U.S. at 444. 
100 William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The 
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375. 
101 The U.S.S.R. organized the Comintern (Communist International) in 1919 to spread 
communism all over the world. See id. at 388. 
102 As Justice Frankfurter wrote in a December 1942 letter to Justice Murphy, “the 
Soviet Government fashioned the Comintern—the Third International—as the instrument 
of the political export business of the Soviet and the Communist Party.  In each country 
there was a branch office of this international export business of the Soviet Government. 
And those who were running the branch business in the various countries were, in fact, 
political instruments of the Soviet regime.” Id. at 430. 
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[Slide]  This quote from Dennis I think exemplifies the point: 
“[t]he existence of the conspiracy . . . creates the danger. . . . If the 
ingredients of the reaction are present, we cannot bind the 
government to wait until the catalyst is added.”103 
Now, what I want to suggest is that in our time you don’t need 
the U.S.S.R. and the Comintern.  The Internet itself ends up being 
sort of the unstated substitute—or the stated substitute—for a 
conspiracy or a network, because information flows everywhere, to 
everyone. 
[Slide]  So we have a number of shifts in the assessment of 
harm.  People are beginning to argue in the law review literature 
that technical information does not really have very much 
expressive value.104  I think we see a downgrading of science. 
[Slide]  There have been a number of articles criticizing the 
Brandenburg decision in recent years, and they end up saying 
things like, we should consider the gravity of the harm, etc., etc.105  
I understand where these proposals are coming from, but they 
promote ad hoc balancing and do not provide the kind of 
protection for speech that the Brandenburg test does. 
[Slide]  One of the problems of these tests is that they focus 
strictly on a quantitative or sort of an actual risk of harm.  In the 
Brandenburg situation, you are not necessarily talking about a 
speaker who intends a bad result.  So when you eliminate or dilute 
 
103 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See also United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 1950) (“Any border fray, any diplomatic incident, any difference 
in construction of the modus vivendi—such as the Berlin blockade we have just 
mentioned—might prove a spark in the tinder-box, and lead to war.  We do not 
understand how one could ask for a more probable danger, unless we must wait till the 
actual eve of hostilities.”). 
104 See Valeria M. Fogleman & James Etienne Victor, The Critical Technologies 
Approach: Controlling Scientific Communication for the National Security, 4 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 293, 373 (1990); S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Recalibrating the Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1159 (2000). 
105 See, e.g., David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, 
Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1994); Cass Sunstein, Is Violent Speech a Right?, 6 AM. PROSPECT 22, 34 (1995) 
(“Brandenburg made a great deal of sense for the somewhat vague speech in question . . . 
where relatively few people were in earshot” but “when messages advocating murderous 
violence flow to large numbers of people, the calculus changes.”). 
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an intent requirement, then you are essentially attributing the 
foreseeable consequences of what others may do with speech to the 
speaker. 
[Slide]  I think we also have associated with the rise of the 
Internet a changing notion of the public. Traditionally, in First 
Amendment law, the public has been viewed as a whole. 
One of the things we see in the censorware area is, at the very 
least, an audience segregation between the minors and everyone 
else.  But the terrorism situation, I think, is turning it into 
something even more dangerous.  The public is now seen as an 
aggregate or a composite of many different parts, multiple 
audiences, and we are beginning to see our job, or people are 
beginning to see the job, as how do we keep those audiences 
segregated—how do we speak to one set but not the other.  In a 
scientific context, that turns into a “need to know” mentality. 
[Slide]  And you actually see that in the DMCA.  There are 
exceptions, for instance, for encryption research106 and for reverse-
engineering.107  But within those exceptions there are also 
restrictions on who you can give the information to.108  The idea is 
not that, if you can do the research, then you can publish the 
information openly.  There is instead the idea that it should only be 
disseminated to, say, bona fide encryption researchers, although 
the Act does not specify how you know who those are.109 
[Slide]  So here is the general recap.  What I worry about is 
that under the pressure of these many different areas, and I’m not 
 
106 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000). 
107 See id. § 1201(f). 
108 See id. § 1201(f)(3) (limiting the scope of dissemination for information gained 
through exempted acts); id. § 1201(g)(3)(A) (noting that the applicability of encryption 
research exemption depends on “whether the information derived from the encryption 
research was disseminated, and if so, whether it was disseminated in a manner reasonably 
calculated to advance the state of knowledge or development of encryption technology, 
versus whether it was disseminated in a manner that facilitates infringement under this 
title or a violation of applicable law other than this section, including a violation of 
privacy or breach of security”). 
109 See id. § 1201(g)(3)(B) (stating that the applicability of encryption research 
exemption depends on “whether the person is engaged in a legitimate course of study, is 
employed, or is appropriately trained or experienced, in the field of encryption 
technology”). 
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saying that they are all coming from the same place—whether it is 
from intellectual property, whether it is from concern about sexual 
imagery, whether it is concern about national security or economic 
harm—the sort of pressure is to take Brandenburg back to 
something that looks a lot like the Dennis test.110 
[Slide]  I will stop with a quote from Justice Jackson in 
Korematsu,111 which sums up my feeling about where we seem to 
be heading in free speech law: “The principle then lies about like a 
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring 
forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”112 
We understand why a lot of these different interest groups want 
to restrict scientific publication, why they want to impose liability 
on speakers for what their hearers may do.  But, even though they 
do not intend it, there is a real danger of that kind of principle 
becoming ensconced in First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you, Lee, for a 
fascinating broadening of the problem.  Essentially you are talking 
about dual-use data and dual-use audiences and the kinds of First 
Amendment problems those now pose for us. 
I think we will move right to Chuck Sims, who we heard on the 
last panel, so I will abbreviate the introduction.  I will just point 
out that in this field he has litigated challenges to content-based 
restrictions on cable television programming in the Supreme Court 
case Denver Area Educational Television Consortium v. Federal 
 
110 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (“In each case courts must ask 
whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of 
free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”). 
111 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
112 Id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military commander may overstep the bounds 
of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we review and approve, that passing 
incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”). 
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Communications Commission,113 and he was also involved in the 
First Amendment challenge114 to New York’s Son of Sam law.115 
MR. SIMS: And I was co-counsel with Ann, although not co-
trial counsel, in the library filtering case.116  Jake Lewis seems like 
a very nice guy, and I am sure I would feel better about his 
censorship decisions, even his library discretionary decisions, than 
John Ashcroft’s.  But I think that he tells a tale which is essentially 
Hamlet117 without the ghost, which wouldn’t be a very interesting 
play.  The version of the CIPA you got, the version of why the 
Court ought to come out one way or why the case ought to come 
out one way, is missing so much that you can’t really understand 
what is going on.  And, more importantly, it bears really no 
relationship to what is really going on in terms of what Congress is 
attempting to do and what is happening out there. 
So let me begin not with the doctrine, because the doctrinal 
move by the government in these cases is to take the money, take 
the federal funding, and try to use that as an opportunity, as an 
occasion to accomplish what everybody, I think, agrees cannot be 
accomplished directly.  That is, the Supreme Court would quickly 
strike down an effort to tell every library in the country that they 
had to employ one of these four companies to install filters to 
accomplish all this on the Internet. 
The argument is made, and it is made here and it is made in 
other contexts—and Lee actually raised an interesting point that I 
want to come to also—the argument is made that even though the 
government could not do this directly to every library, as long as 
there is a funding stream it can attach these conditions to the 
funding stream. 
 
113 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (holding that a Federal Communications Commission order 
implementing the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act contained 
two provisions that violated the First Amendment, and upholding a third provision). 
114 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding that the law violates the First Amendment and is not 
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s goals). 
115 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 632-a(1) (McKinney 1982). 
116 Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), prob. 
juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). 
117 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET (Harold Jenkins ed., 1982) (Second Quarto ed. 
1604). 
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That is fundamentally worrisome.  And in areas like this, where 
huge percentages of libraries, for example, get and need federal 
funding and become used to federal funding, unless the Supreme 
Court backs away from that kind of argument, we will in fact have 
what would be impermissible direct regulation, and it will be 
indistinguishable in effect. 
Let me start with just a few of what I think are indisputable 
facts and then get to some of the doctrinal points. 
I think it is undisputed that as a result of the CIPA we will have 
blocking—that is, speech on the Internet by Ann’s and my clients 
and others which would be directed out to the public and which 
some members of the public would want to see, will not in fact get 
to some members of the public that will want to see it.  That is to 
say, there will in fact be women in public libraries who will want 
to learn certain things about breast cancer, 118 or who will want to 
learn about a Republican candidate’s position on Internet 
censorship.119 
One of the great plaintiffs in this case is a Republic candidate 
who, two or four years ago, was campaigning, among other things, 
on the basis that Congress needs to clean up the Internet, and then 
he found out that his own campaign web site was blocked.120 
Planned Parenthood’s sites are blocked in various places.121  
All sorts of breast cancer awareness things.122 
So the first fact is that there will be blocking of speech from 
willing speakers to willing listeners as a result of this law. 
Second, the impact would happen notwithstanding the fact that 
nobody at that local public library wants that to happen.  So that 
this image of the defense, which is essentially the virtues of 
 
118 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (noting that one library patron used 
library Internet access to research breast cancer and reconstructive surgery). 
119 See id. at 416 (discussing Jeffrey Pollock, a Republican candidate from Oregon, who 
sought election in 2000 and 2002). 
120 See id. 
121 See id. (discussing Planned Parenthood and the sorts of information that it provides 
over the Internet). 
122 See id. at 427 (discussing one library patron’s embarrassment if he had to request 
that breast cancer web sites be “unlocked” so that he might research treatment and 
surgery options for his mother when she was diagnosed with the disease). 
6 - PANEL III FORMAT 5/12/03  8:39 AM 
862 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:831 
nineteenth century small-town librarian’s connoisseurship and 
collectorship is a picture which doesn’t bear much relationship to 
the reality.  The reality is not that Mary Smith librarian is deciding 
this would be bad for Johnny and Susie.  The reality is that one of 
these four filtering companies has a program that results in 
information about a Republican Congressman not being available 
and information about Planet Out not being available. 
The prime mover, the initial cause here, is not the local 
librarian exercising the kind of judgment she makes about which 
books to buy.  The prime mover is the Congress of the United 
States, which wants to clean up the Internet. 
The third indisputable fact, I think, is that this censorship—and 
I call it censorship because it blocks willing speakers from 
reaching willing listeners—happens without any judicial review, 
without any public participation whatsoever. 
There is a whole very interesting line of cases developed in the 
late 1950s through the 1960s which are sometimes referred to as 
the First Amendment due process cases.123  They are the cases 
where, after the Court had figured out doctrinally that it would 
consider obscenity outside of the First Amendment, it was left with 
the problem that obscene speech may not be speech.124  But 
mistakes get made and judgments have to be made.  How will we 
reliably and safely, consistent with liberty, make sure that the right 
decisions get made? 
The judgment was that policemen—even judges—cannot 
simply announce “this is unprotected.”  They have to take it step 
by step.  There need to be careful procedures which do not result in 
censorship, with hearings and opportunities to be heard, until the 
judicial decision gets made.  So that, although government is 
allowed to get obscene speech off the streets, off the bookshelves, 
out of the bookstores, we will not have overly censored or 
 
123 See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process”, 83 HARV. L. 
REV. 518, 551 (1970) (remarking that First Amendment due process cases demonstrate 
that First Amendment rights are fragile and processes affecting those rights must be 
carefully scrutinized). 
124 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 490 (1957) (defining obscenity as 
whether, to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interests). 
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overbroad blocking before decisions are made in the way that they 
ought to be made—that is, by judges. 
The way this statute works comprehensively is to trash all of 
that body of law, so that the result is the federal government 
conditions the acceptance of these funding streams on the 
installation of filters.125  If a public library system has ten 
computers funded in part by the federal government, and others it 
purchased outright, all of their computers are covered.126  The 
argument is made by the government—rejected so far, and I think 
it will be by the Court—that because you have accepted any 
portion of this money, you have to follow our rules, even though 
you otherwise would not have with respect to all of your 
computers. 
It seems to me that the analytical underpinnings of this 
argument would permit right now the kind of censorship at MIT 
that Lee was talking about.  That is, the government could make 
the argument—could enact a statute under this view—that any 
institution which receives any federal funding shall have all 
writings by professors reviewed by government security experts 
and only published if they approve. 
The argument that funding is an excuse for control, and control 
well beyond the extent of the funding, is fundamentally 
inconsistent, it seems to me, with the system of freedom of 
expression that we have. 
The fact is that in the Court’s decisions in the collection 
cases—the principal case was the case involving a kid named 
Steven Pico, who was represented by the ACLU when I was 
there—the Court had to leave, and properly I suggest did leave, 
discretion in the hands of school libraries about what books to buy, 
because there was no other choice.127  Given limited budgets, the 
fact is librarians inevitably have to pick and choose what to buy, 
 
125 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000). 
126 See id. 
127 See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
869–71 (1982) (holding that, while the school board may have some discretion to remove 
books, such removal may be called into question if motivated by the desire to suppress 
certain ideas). “Our Constitution does not permit the official suppression of ideas.” Id. at 
871. 
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and in those decisions the Court saw that strict scrutiny was an 
impossible standard to apply. 
But where the Internet is simply connecting a computer and 
you have the whole world available to you, if decisions are going 
to get made about keeping certain things off, they ought not to be 
made by the federal government for the whole country, and they 
certainly ought not to be—effectively, by the design of the 
statute—delegated to private companies that have criteria for 
control that they are not obligated to talk about. 
Astonishingly, in the course of litigating this case, a federal 
court in California, I think it was, which got the discovery dispute 
involving this third-party censoring library-filtering company, held 
that that filtering company had trade secrets and they were entitled 
not to provide meaningful discovery to the plaintiff’s lawyers in 
this case.128  That it seems to me is fundamentally wrong.  It was a 
terrible decision.  It is inconsistent with what I understand the law 
to be. 
It does seem to me that at the end of the day, if there is going to 
be censorship, and if the censorship is going to be the result of 
decisions made by private companies, courts, one way or the other, 
are going to allow people challenging these kinds of decisions to 
get into what is happening out there and why what is happening is 
happening. 
I do think that the fundamental issue here really is the issue 
about whether government funding, which is a larger and larger 
share of everybody’s lives—and there are government streams of 
moneys that go to universities, that go to schools, that go all over 
the society—whether those will become an occasion for the kind of 
direct regulation that is otherwise not permissible.  I do not think 
so. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Thank you. 
 
128 See Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01-CV-1560 (S.D. Cal. 
filed Aug. 29, 2001). 
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I think what I would like to do is start to see if any of the 
panelists have reaction to things that were said.  We will just go 
down the line. 
MR. LEWIS: I guess I should say a couple of things about the 
points that Charles made. 
The paradigm of the First Amendment is a willing speaker 
being able to communicate with willing listeners.  But this case 
involves a library.  If I write a book, I am a willing speaker, and 
there may well be—I mean, strange as it may seem—there might 
be somebody in a library who might want to take out that book, but 
I do not have any right to have the librarian acquire that book. 
You cannot take the library out of the equation and what the 
library does.  There is inevitably a selection process going on.  Just 
calling it censorship does not make it unconstitutional. 
The problem with saying that all federal funding raises these 
kind of conditions that are impermissible because they are indirect 
regulation, is it prevents then the federal government from 
imposing any kind of conditions on its funding if somebody can 
come up with any kind of First Amendment impact of it.  The 
federal government, obviously—any government—has the 
appropriate ability within constitutional constraints to make sure 
that its money is spent the way it wants it to be spent.129  Otherwise 
it is not going to spend the money. 
There was a lot missing from my presentation, and partly that 
was my editorial judgment, not unlike that of a librarian, about 
which issues to focus on. 
But one of the things that should not be lost sight of is the 
congressional motivation.  Detailed in the district court opinion is 
the fact that libraries, even before CIPA, have been struggling with 
this problem of unlimited Internet access and what kinds of 
constraints to put on Internet access.130 
 
129 See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–10 (1987) (discussing 
Congress’s right to further policies through funding, but noting the limits to Congress’s 
right). 
130 See Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 422–23 (E.D. Pa. 
2002) (explaining the importance of Internet access and public libraries), prob. juris. 
noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002). 
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There was the example of the Greenville, South Carolina, 
library that had a serious problem of people misusing their web 
surfing on sexually explicit sites, pulling all sorts of tricks, like 
leaving the site up for the next person who sits down at the 
terminal and it pops up with a scene that they were not really 
themselves planning to surf on.131  There were some examples, 
anecdotal to be sure, of children that had been exposed to sexually 
explicitly materials—somebody calling some kid over and saying, 
“Hey, kid, look at this.”132 
The fact is that there is a problem.  Even the district court here 
found there is a huge amount of pornography on the web.133  
Unless there is some kind of filtering or some kind of method of 
restricting access a library is going to encounter the problems that 
arise with library use of the Internet that librarians, even apart from 
any federal funding, traditionally have had to deal with. 
So Congress was concerned that its funds were up to that point 
unrestricted.  Congress was concerned about this problem of 
pornography on the web and protecting children from the web.  It 
looked at its funding and thought it may actually be exacerbating 
this problem.  We want libraries to be connected to the Internet, we 
want that whole host of information that they get there, but we 
really want to try and make an effort so that the bad doesn’t come 
swooping in with the good and that parents have to worry about 
their children being exposed to online material that might be 
harmful to them. 
The district court talked about a lot of other methods that 
libraries could employ.134  But the primary one was just the old 
traditional notion of the librarian coming over and tapping you on 
the shoulder, “What are you looking at?  That doesn’t comport 
with our Internet use policy.  You will have to go off or we’ll have 
 
131 See id. at 423 (discussing, generally, how some patrons may unwittingly be exposed 
to sexual or pornographic images). 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 419 (“There is a vast amount of sexually explicit material via the Internet 
and the Web.”). 
134 See id. at 426, 480–81 (outlining less intrusive means that libraries may employ to 
monitor Internet use). 
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to suspend your library privileges.”135  When we go back to the 
technology and the difficulty of seeing how effective or how 
refined filtering can bewell, the traditional method, the tap on 
the shoulder, can oftentimes be much less refined. In a sense, 
filtering software was a way of trying to regularize these kinds of 
decisions. 
The other thing isnot to get into the details of the 
filteringbut the filtering software can be tweaked in various 
ways.  The statute itself allows for disabling—a web site can be 
unblocked if it turns out that there is a site that somebody thinks is 
not covered by the statute.136 
It is by no means clear to me that even if one were to put 
everything aside, that one would prefer a regime where librarians 
have to march up and down the rows and tap people on the 
shoulder when they are surfing a site that is not appropriate for 
their Internet use policy, as opposed to persons for the most part 
having a web surfing experience that is private from the librarian 
and every once in awhile something pops up that may be 
blocked—might only come once in a blue moon or never. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Ann? 
MS. BEESON: Yes, just briefly. 
First of all, just in terms of Jake’s latest comment about the 
librarian versus the filter and which regime we prefer, I think he is 
comparing apples to oranges a little bit. 
Just to give a very concrete example, it seems highly unlikely 
to me that any librarian anywhere in the country would go up to a 
patron who is looking at a site about Buddhist nuns and tell them 
that they should not be looking at it. 
The point is that the filters do not just block access to sexually 
explicit sites.  They block access to a whole range of sites that do 
not come anywhere close to the line.  And just to be clear, when 
we were talking about the 4,000 sites that we put into evidence, 
 
135 See id. 
136 See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000); Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 426 
(“The librarians who testified at trial whose libraries use Internet filtering software all 
provide methods by which their patrons may ask the library to unblock specific Web sites 
or pages.”). 
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those were those kind of sites we were talking about.  They were 
not breast cancer sites.  They were not sites targeted to the lesbian 
and gay community.  They were sites that could not, under 
anyone’s definition of pornography, even conceivably be 
considered improper in a public library.  And that is the kind of 
stuff that we are, of course, primarily worried about that is going to 
happen under a filtering regime. 
I also want to say, because I don’t think it has been brought up 
yet and this continues to be a problem with every single attempt by 
Congress to try to restrict the availability of sexually explicit 
material over the Internet, they continue to act as if their primary 
concern is protecting minors.  All of the discussion is around the 
protection of minors. 
All of the legislation has, unquestionably, on its face, burdened 
the ability of adults to obtain access to speech that is clearly 
protected for them. 
And so I think we need to be very careful in talking about what 
the harm is and what we all agree should be fixed.  Even if we 
could all agree that something should be done about unwitting 
exposure of children to sexually explicit material, that is not what 
these statutes are doing.  What they are doing is throwing out the 
baby with the bath water and preventing adults from also viewing 
this material. 
And also, on the question of other alternatives, there are other 
ways for parents to exercise their discretion and their role as 
parents in preventing their children from obtaining unwanted 
material. 
First of all, there was a lot of evidence at trial put in that 
librarians are not by any means ignoring this problem.137  They are 
very concerned about this notion that their community could 
potentially be harmed in their library.  They have gone to great 
lengths to come up with ways to deal with it that do not infringe on 
speech, which include Internet use policies, and exercising their 
 
137 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 423–24 (discussing how librarians 
monitor Internet use). 
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traditional role to prevent disruptive behavior in the library, which 
is a very different thing from speech.138 
So when you are talking about this example that the 
government loves to trot out about the guy who asks the little girl 
to come over and look at a porn site—I mean, give me a break.  
There are rules, and they have been there ever since the beginning 
of librarianship in this country. 
MR. LEWIS: You like the Buddhist nun example. 
MS. BEESON: I know, I know.  We all trot out our best 
examples.  It’s true. 
A lot of these alternatives that librarians have come up with are 
educational.  They are training parents, training kids, on how to use 
the Internet so they do not unwittingly come across harmful 
material. 
Here is where we talk about real library selection.  When you 
talk about library selection in the context of the Internet, librarians 
are doing it in much more of the same way they did in the print 
world, by choosing the best sites.  Now you can sign on in the 
kids’ section of the library and what you get are the 100 best sites 
for kids that the librarians have reviewed and looked at.  That is a 
great way to start your kid off on the Internet.  It does not exclude 
people from going elsewhere, but it does keep the librarian’s role 
in selecting the best sites for the kids. 
And finally, just one last point in terms of these other 
alternatives.  In 1998, Congress commissioned a study by the 
National Research Council to look into various ways to address the 
problem of pornography on the Internet.139  The head of the 
National Research Council’s report commission was a former 
Attorney General, Dick Thornburgh.  They wrote a 400-page book, 
which I urge anyone interested in this issue to read, which 
documents an incredible range of alternatives that we all have for 
addressing this problem that do not involve mandatory penalties or 
funding restrictions as restrictive of speech as this statute is.140 
 
138 See id. 
139 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, YOUTH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE INTERNET (Dick 
Thornburgh & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2002). 
140 See id. 
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MR. TIEN: Yes.  There is a real difference, I think, between, as 
Chuck put it, this ideal of the library and the librarians making 
their decisions and Congress imposing a particular strategy across 
all libraries. 
At the EFF we think too much exposure in the libraries of kids 
to pornography is a problem.  But the answer is not to say, we’re 
just going to block it.  The answer is, as Ann was talking about, 
education.  There are many, many ways that it could be done. 
In one of the papers that we did for this National Research 
Council Report141 we pointed out that the problem with systematic 
laws and with censorware—and I underscore the word 
“systematic”—is that you don’t know what is going to be blocked. 
One of the things that we have tried to show, and that I think 
was shown in the CIPA case,142 was that these are not just random 
accidents, that there are specific technical reasons why certain sorts 
of things are blocked.143  When you block by text, you are going to 
have systematic overblocking related to the presence of certain key 
words.  There is a virtual hosting problem, where because one 
domain is under a lot of other domains and if they want to block 
that domain, they would simply have to block all of the others that 
go with it.  There are systematic technical reasons why censorware 
is always going to overblock. 
Now, some people will say maybe the technology will get 
better and better and better.  Well, I think that is really highly 
unlikely.  On the one hand, there are technical problems with it of 
the kind I just mentioned.  And then, second, at the end of the day 
what we are asking the software to do is to make judgments, legal 
judgments, about what is harmful to minors or what is obscene.  I 
think it is going to be very, very difficult for any piece of software 
to make judgments either about the value of a work, which is one 
of the problems, and also to make an accurate judgment about 
contemporary community standards, which is another element of 
it.  If you can’t make those judgments, you are not going to have 
anything that is even close to constitutionally sensitive. 
 
141 See id. 
142 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 401. 
143 See id. at 427–50. 
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Maybe artificial intelligence will get there, but if it does, we 
will be in such a different world that they wouldn’t need lawyers in 
the first place. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Would it really be such a 
different world?  I mean, we look to individuals to make those 
judgments, but we don’t trust those.  We send it to the courts to 
decide whether the individual is right.  Why would it be any 
different sending the technical artificial intelligence decisions to a 
court to determine whether the program kicked out the right site or 
the wrong site? 
MR. TIEN: What I mean by the world being different is that 
everything in the world would be different.  I mean society itself 
would be completely different if we had computers capable of 
making human judgments of that sort.  I think we should not fall 
into the trap of believing that we can think about that kind of 
advance in technology and hold the rest of society constant.  So I 
do not want to speculate as to what anything is going to be like 
with that level of intelligence in a computer. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: You are assuming the level of 
human intelligence making the decision is at a high degree right 
now.  It sounds to me like you are suggesting that the computer has 
to do it at least equivalently or rather better than the human.  I am 
not sure that is the right threshold. 
MR. TIEN: I would say that it would have to do it as well as a 
human. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: It raises some interesting 
questions.  I think this came up from Chuck’s emphasizing the fact 
that there are only four companies—I think he mentioned that at 
least two or three times—that do the filtering and we don’t know 
how they are doing the filtering.  Well, wouldn’t the solution 
simply be higher transparency requirements in how the filtering is 
done?  And if the obligation is there for the libraries receiving 
federal funds to purchase filtering programs, then presumably a 
marketplace would emerge with a substantially greater number of 
companies out there offering products for sale to libraries. 
What would be your response to that? 
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MR. SIMS: Well, part of the answer is what Ann indicated, 
that it is not a happenstance that these products don’t work.  There 
are fundamental reasons why they cannot work, at least for the 
foreseeable future.  I am not sure what the Supreme Court would 
do if there was anything like that that could with 100 percent 
reliability distinguish what we all think of as commercial porn 
from everything else. 
I would think that the Supreme Court is going to be 
fundamentally affected by the fact that the facts are nowhere near 
that.  The rule has been that where First Amendment interests are 
at stake, precision of regulation is the touchstone. 
Jake wants to talk about percentages and talk about how things 
are getting better and better.  But, as I understand the First 
Amendment, if one web site of Planned Parenthood, of a 
Republican Congressman or of David Hume or anybody else, 
which is protected speech and not harmful, is going to get blocked, 
that is going to be the end of the case. 
MR. LEWIS: No, not this case, because in a facial challenge 
the one doesn’t get you there.  Now, as applied challenge—and I 
think that was Joel’s point, that you always have a second round on 
this stuff. 
If there was a specific person who asks a librarian to unblock a 
site, and the librarian says “no way,” well, then you’ve got another 
lawsuit for those particular facts. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Why do we assume that is the 
standard—that if there is a single web site out there that gets 
blocked, that is the standard we should be looking at?  Sort of ball-
parking some of these numbers— 
MR. SIMS: Because the First Amendment says Congress shall 
pass no law restricting the freedom of speech,144 and if there are 
willing speakers and there are willing listeners and the government 
is intervening and blocking them from getting together, that 
violates the First Amendment.145 
 
144 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
145 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Comm. of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Communications 
Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
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PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Well, in this case the 
government is simply saying, you can’t spend taxpayers’ money 
for people to look at pornography in a public library. 
MR. SIMS: But then the government could just as well say any 
university that gets any federal funding in its physics department 
must submit everything written by the physics faculty to 
government review.  The Court will not uphold such a statute.  The 
fact of government funding will not, in the end, I think, be deemed 
to be sufficient to support regulation that would be impermissible 
if done directly. 
MS. BEESON: Let me just jump in and say something in 
response to your question about transparency.  That is, we do 
believe that, obviously, having a transparent list would help, of 
course, because it would mean that at least you could review and 
improve the products.  Contrary to what the companies may 
believe, we are actually not trying to put them out of business. 
In fact, a little irony here—I’m sure Jake thinks it’s ironic, at 
least—we put forth the availability of filters as a voluntary option 
for parents to use in arguing that filters are one possible less-
restrictive alternative to criminal penalties for restriction of free 
speech, like are at issue in the first two attempts by Congress to 
address this problem.146 
So we are not trying to say that there should not be filters out 
there.  We are trying to say that they should not be mandated by 
the federal government and that they should be as good as they can 
possibly be, and therefore the list should be transparent. 
Transparency would not solve all the problems, because of 
course it would only help after the fact.  It would only mean that 
once someone happened to discover that a site on the list was 
improperly categorized, they might get it fixed, and therefore 
further blocking might not happen.  But up until that time, it is 
almost certain that the original user would get blocked.  That is a 
 
146 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223, 231 (2000).  Two provisions of the CDA relating to the 
protection of minors from harmful material on the Internet were declared facially 
overbroad and in violation of the First Amendment. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 
(1997). 
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prior restraint on speech and we think it violates the First 
Amendment. 
MR. LEWIS: I guess now that the words “prior restraint” have 
been spoken— 
MS. BEESON: I know.  I was waiting. 
MR. LEWIS: This is a library.  By that logic, it really is—I 
mean, there are a lot of problems that come out, and interesting 
questions, outside the library context, but this case happens to be a 
library case. 
The thing that I have had trouble understanding is a prior 
restraint argument in the library, where you have to go up to the 
librarian and ask to borrow a book, for the most part.  You can take 
it off the shelf, if the book happens to be on the shelf.  In a closed 
stack library, like the New York Library’s main branch, for every 
book, ninety-nine percent of the books, you have to go and ask 
permission to borrow the book.  If there is a prior restraint in all of 
this, then there is a prior restraint in practically everything that a 
librarian does. 
The transparency point is kind of interesting because the 
selection process—and I have tried to get myself up to speed on 
exactly what book selection principles are and collection 
development philosophy and things like that—that process is 
entirely nontransparent.  I would say that the principles are stated 
at such a level of generality that they do not provide you with any 
real information about how a particular selection decision is going 
to be made. 
But, interestingly enough, as I understand the software, while 
you do not have a list of the sites ex ante, you can plug a website in 
and immediately get an answer about whether that site would be 
blocked or not.147  So there is at least transparency to that extent. 
I guess there are two points I would make.  First, in this First 
Amendment area, going back to the title of the discussion, there is 
a position that the First Amendment permits no regulation of 
 
147 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 430 (referring to the ability to enter URLs 
into “the ‘URL checker’ that most filtering software companies provide on their Web 
sites”). 
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speech at all.  While I suppose that is a possible reading of the First 
Amendment, it has never been one that the Court has adopted.  If it 
was adopted to the extent that I think many would argue on the 
other side of these cases, it would simply paralyze government 
action to address this kind of problem, because it would just act as 
sort of a trump card, where you raise it and all discussion stops. 
But there are many cases in which the government is able to 
regulate speech if it has a sufficiently compelling interest, even 
when strict scrutiny is involved and the regulation is narrowly 
tailored.148  Here I don’t think strict scrutiny is applicable, because 
if strict scrutiny is applicable to this kind of action, then it is 
applicable even to Ann’s example of the best web sites.  Somebody 
could say, “Well, what are you putting that up for?  Those aren’t 
my best web sites.  Where did you come up with those best web 
sites?  You mean because of the content of the speech?” 
The other thing I would say on these discussions, because it is 
interesting, is there also seems to be a view that the Internet is 
another world, that we are not of this world when we go into the 
Internet.  I think this library case is an example—it is not the only 
example, but one example—of a situation in which it really sort of 
depends on how you view what happens when you connect to the 
Internet.  Do you somehow, like in a “Star Trek” episode, go into 
hyperspace somewhere and come out in another dimension?  Or is 
the Internet connection really simply an aspect of this world that 
we live in?  If it is, then maybe many of the same rules that would 
govern the offline world should govern the online world. 
MR. TIEN: Can I say something real quick?  This last point is 
one of the points that I was trying to make in my presentation.  I 
have been listening to you talk about continually sort of 
mapping—you say, “It’s a library, it’s a library, it’s just the same 
thing.”  And yet, in many other areas, such as when people say the 
Internet is a vehicle for piracy, the world has changed, we’ve got to 
do something different, so there is real instability. 
 
148 See, e.g., Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may . . . regulate the content of 
constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses 
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). 
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And when you look at it from the larger perspective, there is a 
complete incoherency in the way the Internet gets played.  
Basically it gets spun in whatever direction people want to spin it.  
If the government wants to spin it as something that they want to 
regulate, they say this is just like real space and we should use the 
same rules.  But if, on the other hand, they say the Internet is a big 
threat, then they will spin it as something unprecedented, we never 
had this sort of problem before because of the Internet.  That just 
doesn’t make sense to me. 
MS. BEESON: If I could make just one quick comment— 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: And then we will go to 
questions from the floor. 
MS. BEESON: I really think that there is a fundamental 
misunderstanding here between the notion of selection and 
prohibition.  I mean, just to be really clear, when a librarian 
decides to house a particular book on the shelf in the physical 
collection, there is nothing in that decision that prevents the patron 
from obtaining a book that does not happen to be on the shelf.  In 
fact—and the record shows this quite clearly—the very purpose of 
librarianship is to go out of their way through any means possible 
to get the patron exactly what they want, and they do this even if 
the book isn’t on the shelf.  They put in requests for inter-library 
loans.  There are a number of different ways the librarian will try 
to get the information to the patron, even if it is not sitting on the 
shelf.149 
Similarly, of course, when a library decides to come up with a 
list of selected web sites, they aren’t preventing patrons from 
accessing sites that are not on their list.  They are just providing a 
kind of value-added service of saying, we think these are the best 
sites in case you want to start here first, but we will help you get 
other ones if they are not here. 
So I really think that there is a misunderstanding here in what 
Jake is saying about the listing and it being analogous to filtering. 
MR. LEWIS: But if I try to borrow or get a subscription to 
Hustler magazine, the facts show that I’ve got eight out of 48,000 
 
149 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 420–21. 
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libraries that I can possibly go to.  There is a limit to what the 
librarians are going to do, and there has always been a limit to the 
boundaries under which they find the right book for the right 
person. 
PROFESSOR REIDEENBERG: You are also shifting the point 
of inquiry, because if what the blocking program at the library does 
is it says you can’t visit this site but the librarian can unblock the 
site on request, that is much like the book wasn’t there on the shelf 
and I go to inter-library loan to get a copy. 
MS. BEESON: The problem, of course, is in the inter-library 
loan context there is nothing which has made a judgment that this 
is bad speech—I mean, nothing whatsoever, because there are no 
value judgments on what is sitting on the library shelf.  Whereas 
under this system— 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: There is the value judgment of 
whether the librarian chose to stock it. 
MS. BEESON: What the CIPA literally says is, you are 
blocked because this site has been categorized as pornography.150  
I mean, how many patrons do you think are going to go up to their 
librarian and say, I want to have access to the Buddhist nun site 
because it has been blocked?  Maybe that one person would. 
MR. LEWIS: Just to make it clear, the CIPA doesn’t say 
anything about how the message gets put.  It just says if there is a 
technological protection measure—and actually that, in terms of 
tweaking the software, if your problem is only with what pops up, 
to just say, “This web site has been preliminarily categorized as 
subject to the CIPA. Please see your librarian.” 
MS. BEESON: As being illegal for you to look at in this 
library. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Does CIPA even require that 
you identify the blocked site as being categorized that way? 
MR. LEWIS: No, no.  It could say “access blocked.” 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: “Please see the librarian.” 
MR. LEWIS: Yes, “please see the librarian.” 
 
150 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6). 
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MR. SIMS: But under the law as it works now, people do not 
know what they have not seen. 
MR. LEWIS: That’s not true.  I think it tells—as I understand 
it, you search for a site, when you know what site, and you click on 
a site. 
MR. SIMS: If you are searching for breast cancer, for example, 
there may be twenty sites that you do not see.  There is nothing in 
the law that requires the filtering company to deliver to you the 
information that you have been precluded by the private parties 
from seeing something you have asked for. 
MR. LEWIS: You have gotten finally to the point at which in 
the record—my command is not infallible, but I do know from the 
record that even if you aren’t informed up-front, the librarian has 
that information.151 
MR. SIMS: Jake, let me ask you a question.  Do you think that 
the Court will necessarily want to consider or feel obligated to 
consider this statute, which is really the federal government 
stepping into maybe 80 or 90 percent of the nation’s libraries, as if 
it were exactly the same case as if Ann were challenging a library 
in Mobile, Alabama, which had done the same thing? 
MR. LEWIS: Yes.  I don’t know whether they are going to 
want to, but that is one of the arguments we are making. 
MR. SIMS: I understand.  I think it is a very interesting 
federalism kind of issue.  When a fundamentalist parent in 
Nebraska wants to take a ten-year-old to New York City, they 
can’t have a clean New York City.  They can only come to New 
York City by being willing to subject themselves to newsstands 
that have breasts hanging out all over the place. 
MR. LEWIS: But the interesting part about the district court 
decision here—and this is actually one of the interesting things 
about how the litigation went—there was an argument, and there 
still is an argument, that the librarians should just be free to make 
whatever decisions they want, free of governmental interference or 
a thumb on the scale from funding. 
 
151 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 426–27, 430. 
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But the way the district court resolved the issue, they 
essentially took that judgment out of even the librarian’s hand by 
saying that this content-based kind of selection, at least insofar as 
the Internet is concerned, is a violation of First Amendment.152  It 
prevents the librarian back in the Midwest from making that kind 
of determination either.  It is not a question of just cleaning up 
New York.  Nobody can clean up everything, wherever you are. 
MS. BEESON: That is a complete overstatement.  First of all, 
we are only challenging— 
MR. LEWIS: Simplification. 
MS. BEESON: Yes, simplification. 
We are only challenging the filters as they apply in public 
libraries, first of all, so this whole other issue about schools we 
haven’t even gotten into. 
MR. LEWIS: I didn’t mean to open that up. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: The CIPA also requires that 
any school receiving funding under EAA or qualifying for discount 
pricing for Internet access must have filtering in the school 
computer systems that are connected to the Internet.153  You have 
tactfully avoided touching that part. 
MR. LEWIS: Ann is absolutely right.  She did not challenge 
that part. 
MS. BEESON: In this case. 
MR. LEWIS: This case does not involve the schools. 
MS. BEESON: This case does not involve that. 
MR. LEWIS: The other shoe. 
MS. BEESON: The point is the one that I made before, which 
is that a number of libraries who are our clients in the case already 
do have filters in the libraries for parents who want to use them.  It 
is just a voluntary option.  The filter is there.  Sometimes it is even 
a default.  The filter is there in the kids’ section of the library.  
They are addressing the problem. 
 
152 See id. at 495. 
153 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5). 
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MR. LEWIS: But the library cannot go further and make it 
mandatory. 
MS. BEESON: For adults, that’s right, they cannot. 
MR. LEWIS: That is actually one of the interesting aspects of 
the case.  The district court, not just the CIPA, has cut back on the 
librarians’ ability to make their own independent judgments. 
MR. SIMS: But Ann would have done that eventually anyway. 
MR. LEWIS: She would have tried, that’s for sure. 
MR. TIEN: But is that really—I mean, I am obviously not as 
familiar with the case as you are, but when you look at the 
rationale that is used by the courts for holding the law 
unconstitutional, many of those reasons simply do not apply to the 
case of a librarian making a judgment in the library about content 
decisions. 
MR. LEWIS: That is the interesting thing.  The Court did 
downplay this approval plan option.154  But as far as I can see, 
approval plans, which are the kind of thing where you go to the 
publisher and say, give us your monthly list and we will send back 
the stuff, that is precisely what a filter does, except that the 
librarian acts as the filter for the purposes of the wholesaler.  It 
does seem to me that there is a better match. 
But I agree with you that this case, in part, turns upon how the 
courts are going to look at that mapping of what I would call the 
“real world” and the Internet. 
I am not sure there is an incoherence, to respond to Lee on his 
point.  It is true that people point out that the Internet poses more 
serious problems in certain circumstances than the real world, but 
the framework for analyzing those problems, I think, is often 
overstated, that somehow a different framework needs to apply.  
To my mind, the regular framework, the framework we would 
apply to this same type of problem of a lesser magnitude, would 
also apply to addressing that problem in the Internet context. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Let’s see if we can take 
audience questions now. 
 
154 See Am. Library Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 421. 
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Does anyone in the audience have a question to pose to the 
panel? 
MS. BEESON: Thank you for staying this late on a Friday 
afternoon. 
QUESTIONER (Wendy Seltzer): Thanks. My question is for 
Chuck, who I think is a terrific advocate and I am very pleased to 
have him on our side of this case. 
MR. TIEN: You always want Chuck on your side. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Wendy Seltzer from the 
Berkman Center speaking. 
QUESTIONER: But I am puzzled by what seems to be a 
disconnect between the position here and the position in the DVD 
case,155 where we found ourselves on opposite sides.  There you 
have a technology that is preventing people from accessing and 
making First Amendment-protected fair use of media.  You talked 
about First Amendment due process when the policeman is 
declaring something obscene without judicial intervention.  You 
talked about delegation of control to the filtering companies. 
To me it looks very similar to what the DMCA asks us to do to 
technological protection measures, delegating the control to them 
and relying on those to tell us what is or is not permitted use of 
media. 
MR. SIMS: I must say I don’t think there is any inconsistency 
at all. 
MS. BEESON: You are just afraid to answer the question with 
me sitting up here, Chuck.  Come on. 
MR. SIMS: No.  Not speaking for any clients here, it was 
perfectly clear to me that the Felten case was totally concocted, as 
the district court found,156 and because there was never any 
 
155 Mr. Sims was an attorney for the plaintiffs in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2000), which found defendants violated the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA by posting their DeCSS program on the web. 
156 Felten v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. dismissed Nov. 
28, 2001). See EFF, Frequently Asked Questions About Felten & USENIX v. RIAA 
Legal Case, at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/faq_felten.html (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2003) (giving background information about Felten). 
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genuine apprehension that he should have had, and nobody could 
read the DMCA and think that the speech he was going to give in 
Las Vegas, or wherever it was, was going to violate the DMCA.  
He should have just gone ahead, as he eventually did, and give the 
Goddamn speech. 
In the same way, without asking Ann to violate a client 
confidence, in her initial comments she sort of portrayed this 
picture, as I recall it, of little Ben Edelman coming up to her and 
saying, “Boy, I’m really afraid about the DMCA.  Could you bring 
a lawsuit so that I can do my research?” 
In the real world, as I assume that it happened, and as I would 
imagine it happened with Ben Edelman—whose parents, after all, 
didn’t ask a federal court if they could demonstrate against the 
civil rights laws, they just went ahead and did it—in the real world 
he could have gone ahead and just done this work.  It would have 
been fabulous.  It would have helped a lot of people.  He should 
not have worried about any of these legal problems, which are not 
genuine legal problems, and he should have gone ahead and done 
his research and nobody would have sued him. 
So without having the DMCA in front of me, I cannot go 
through the whole list of exemptions that I think would have 
applied to his work, but I think that this lawsuit is feigned, is not 
serious.  Whether or not the Court will end up deciding it, I cannot 
tell.  But it is pretty clear to me that he could have just gone ahead 
and done this research without worrying about it. 
QUESTIONER (Wendy Seltzer): We still can’t take movie 
clips off a DVD without violating the DMCA.157 
MR. SIMS: There are no movies that I am aware of that people 
can’t make extraordinarily extensive fair use of, regardless of 
whether they are on DVDs or not.  I mean, as I have said in various 
contexts, when I was a kid, before there were videocassettes, we all 
had fair use rights to deal with movies.  There was a fair use right 
 
157 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (prohibiting the circumvention of technological 
measures undertaken to protect a copyrighted work). 
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with respect to Gone With the Wind.158  But your fair use had to 
live in a world in which MGM only released this movie every five 
years and they didn’t release copies of it so that people could put 
them in their homes.  It didn’t mean that there was a First 
Amendment violation. It didn’t mean that the First Amendment 
was violated. 
People can make fair use of every movie out there, whether or 
not it is on a DVD.159  Can they also get an undecrypted copy and 
put it on their own computer?  No.  Why?  Because Congress 
decided that the harm that would come from that was greater than 
the benefits.160  That is the kind of judgment Congress makes. 
MS. BEESON: Just to be clear on the Edelman case about the 
current posture on whether or not he is sufficiently threatened, and 
to distinguish it a little bit from the Felten case, in the Felten case, 
after the EFF filed the lawsuit on Felten’s behalf, the recording 
industry pretty much rolled over with respect to the specific 
research at issue.  They wrote a letter promising not to sue for this 
particular paper Felten wanted to present.161 
In the Edelman case, we filed the complaint.162  We would love 
to get a letter like that from N2H2 that says, “You know what?  
We think your research is hunky-dory.  Go ahead and go with it.  
We won’t sue you.” 
Instead, they do not do that at all.  They file this public 
document which says that they do believe that if he does—and also 
in their motion to dismiss that they filed—they catalogued the 
specific harms they will suffer if Edelman does this research.163  
They say that their rights have been violated and that they will go 
 
158 See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (finding the fictional 
work The Wind Done Gone protected under 17 U.S.C. § 107 as parody and, therefore, a 
fair use of decedent’s work Gone with the Wind). 
159 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (providing certain exceptions for the use of copyrighted material 
that will not be considered infringement). 
160 See DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–1322 and 28 U.S.C. § 4001). 
161 See Jennifer 8. Lee, Delayed Report on Encryption Flaws to Be Presented, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at C6. 
162 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Edelman v. N2H2, Inc. (D. Mass. 
filed July 25, 2002) (No. 02-CV-11503), http://archive.aclu.org/court/edelman.pdf. 
163 N2H2, Inc., supra note 35. 
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forward.164  This is a very different situation and it seems clear to 
me that Felten does have standing to get relief in the court. 
MR. TIEN: And if I could add a point about the Felten 
situation, we did not get into that case until after the letter came. 
MR. SIMS: But you stayed in the case and tried to get a 
decision on the merits out of the judge well after you were told “no 
problem.” 
MR. TIEN: Yes.  We were told that there was no problem as to 
the particular paper.  The problem was that there were other people 
on the team who were doing other kinds of research. 
But my point is that there was a real threat from the RIAA and 
from the other private defendant at the outset which generated a 
tremendous amount of controversy within the conference 
organizers in Pittsburgh.165 
MR. SIMS: It would take a lot to persuade me that Ben 
Edelman was afraid to do this research without Ann bringing and 
winning this lawsuit. 
MS. BEESON: You just don’t know how careful he is with his 
money.  This was the guy who made three times as much money as 
I did last year.  He does not want to have to give up some of that 
money to N2H2 because they get a judgment against him.  He just 
doesn’t.  And he should not have to.  That is the whole nature of 
the First Amendment.  Chuck, you know that.  He should not have 
to do that. 
MR. SIMS: And the ACLU would have been there to defend 
him every step of the way. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: Other questions from the floor? 
QUESTIONER: I would like to just say—and then ask a 
question—that it is a sad commentary for me that we, in the name 
of children, in the name of God, sometimes perpetrate some really 
terrible things.  We want to protect children, and in the efforts to 
 
164 See id. 
165 Letter from Matthew J. Oppenheim, Sr. Vice Pres., RIAA, to Prof. Edward Felten, 
Dep’t of Computer Science (Apr. 9, 2001), http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/ 
Felten_v_RIAA/20010409_riaa_sdmi_letter.html. 
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do so we throw out our civil liberties and our history of freedom of 
speech. 
I think in America we have a terrible sex problem, and maybe 
the Congress people have knee-jerk reactions, so that when we get 
legislation which tries to solve a problem of thought control, trying 
to control the thoughts of our children, etc., and when we see it 
doesn’t work, we don’t drop it, we just continue going on with it.  
That is a very sad thing to me.  It is like 1984166 all over again. 
I don’t know how the government and those people who are 
trying to push this kind of a system that filters everything—it is 
just really a sad commentary of where we are.  We are throwing 
the baby out with the bath water by all means, but we are going 
much further.  I think we really hurt America, hurt Americans, 
when we think that way. 
MR. SIMS: Well, there is actually a little ground for optimism.  
There has been a series of these cases since the late 1980s.  Jake 
told me today, which I hadn’t known, that he had litigated most of 
them. 
The fact is that the free speech side wins in the U.S. Supreme 
Court virtually all of them, including one called Playboy v. United 
States167 that I wouldn’t have given you very much money for the 
day it was filed. 
MS. BEESON: Yes.  If anybody is trying to handicap this, I 
don’t think I have ever not won a case that has gone to the 
Supreme Court on this. 
MR. SIMS: Whether Jake is deliberately throwing 
MS. BEESON: It just goes to show you that we are right. 
MR. LEWIS: Or the cases they make me take. 
MR. SIMS: Whether Jake is throwing them or whether the 
Supreme Court is doing the right thing, I don’t know. 
 
166 GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1948). 
167 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (holding that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 
561 (2000), violated the First Amendment by restricting transmission of cable television 
channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming). 
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QUESTIONER: Well, Mr. Sims, I will just say that I am very 
heartened to hear that, and I understand that.  But I am not looking 
forward with great relish to the new composition of our Supreme 
Court and where they will take us down the road. 
MR. LEWIS: I would like to say one thing.  I mean, the fact 
is—you know, glass half-empty or glass half-full, or whatever. 
To look at the other side of the coin, it is quite clear in this area 
that Congress has remained very concerned about it.  You are 
absolutely right that there have been a number of lawsuits in the 
Supreme Court that have struck down statutes that have 
approached this problem from a number of different areas, and 
Congress has not given up.168 
I guess I would view that as being because these are 
conscientious efforts and people have thought long and hard, and 
the courts have made them think long and hard, that they still 
consider there to be a serious problem that they do not want to give 
up on. 
The question obviously in these cases—and they do get 
litigated, and Ann is perfectly happy, I’m sure, to litigate the next 
six statutes— 
MS. BEESON: That’s because we keep winning. 
MR. LEWIS: But you shouldn’t discount the fact that there is a 
significant amount of support in Congress, and presumably outside 
of Congress— 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: In the public. 
MR. LEWIS: —that something should be done.  I think the 
Supreme Court’s remand in the latest case, the COPA case,169 
suggests that even the Court is not willing to sort of give up or 
throw up its hands and say, “Nothing can be done,” although the 
 
168 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. 
Consortium, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Sable 
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
169 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (finding that the COPA’s reference to 
contemporary community standards in defining what was harmful to minors did not alone 
render the COPA unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment). 
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First Amendment does impose a very high standard before the 
Court can regulate speech. 
It would be extraordinary to say that Congress cannot address a 
problem like this, where many people in Congress are of the view 
that there remains a serious problem. 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think it is not just Congress, 
but it is in the country.  The Congress is reflecting the view of the 
country as a whole.  This is one area where, unlike what we heard 
earlier in the debate over intellectual property rights with 
significant economic interests that were at stake, I don’t think you 
see a well-funded anti-porn industry running to Congress for 
protection. 
These are more like grassroots-oriented organizations.  They 
are not organizations that have commercial economic interests at 
stake for Congress to be regulating in this area.  I mean, it is not 
the Trade Association of Software Filter Manufacturers that is 
running to Congress and saying, be sure you mandate that public 
libraries buy my product. It is not that kind of regulation. 
I think there is really a very strong current, and reflected in 
your earlier remark about the composition of the Court.  If this 
current is that deep in the United States and if the Court is 
consistently refusing to allow Congress to regulate in this area, we 
should not be surprised to see changes in the composition of the 
kind of judges that are going to be appointed to the Court. 
We will take one more question up in the back and then we’ll 
break. 
QUESTIONER: My name is Matt Halloran and I’m a student 
here at Fordham. 
Assuming that this is something that we are dedicated to 
stopping, which is a whole other argument—I find it laughable to 
think that fuzzy things like parental education are going to stop 
kids from looking at pornography on the Internet.  I was 
wondering, to that extent, how both sides would feel about calling 
the government’s bluff on this being for kids and just using 
children-dedicated computers with filters on them? 
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MS. BEESON: Yes.  It is an interesting question you raise, 
because there are really two different interests, and I think the 
government is not always so clear in distinguishing these two 
things.  I think they are different. 
One is—and this is the one that I think absolutely can be solved 
by education—one is to prevent children from accidentally 
encountering harmful material on the Internet.  That has been 
shown already—we have the record to prove it—to be addressed in 
some ways by much better ways, by searching strategies and all of 
that.  The filters do not help that problem at all, because no matter 
how much the filters block, there is still a huge amount of sexually 
explicit material available that they are just as likely in fact to 
stumble across. 
The second problem, of course, is the primarily slightly older 
children that I think we would probably all agree are affirmatively 
trying to find that material.  I, frankly, think that is a very different 
issue. 
To the extent that you are talking about teen-agers, I think teen-
agers do have the right to locate and find material about sex.  They 
just do.  They are becoming sexual beings themselves.  I don’t 
think, myself—and speaking for the ACLU, we really don’t 
think—that there should be so much of a difference between the 
rights of teen-agers and the rights of adults to obtain access to very 
purposefully sexually explicit material. 
So I just do not think there is much of an interest left after that. 
MR. LEWIS: When I was a kid, there was no federal grant for 
me to buy Playboy magazine, and to some extent— 
MS. BEESON: Poor Jake. 
MR. LEWIS: I guess if I had been born a little later, a little bit 
down the road, there might be such a grant program. 
But really, you can’t take the federal funding out of the 
equation.  The problem with filtering computers in the children’s 
section is, obviously, particularly for the teen-agers, they will just 
move over to the adult computers that do not have the filters on 
them. 
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This statute, even though it is entitled the Children’s Internet 
Protection Act, obviously does seek to restrict funding of 
unprotected pornography, obscenity, and child pornography for 
adults as well. 
MR. TIEN: I just wanted to underscore Ann’s point about the 
right of minors to receive sexually explicit information.  One of the 
papers included here is a discussion of how, certainly for teen-
agers, probably from fourteen on, there is a very strong legal 
argument that they have a right to receive all sorts of information 
relating to reproductive choice, reproductive sexual health, 
religious information, about their own sexual orientation and 
identity, just coming directly out of the Court’s abortion cases, 
which virtually require that minors have an ability to get that kind 
of information.170 
MR. LEWIS: But the filters do not— 
MS. BEESON: Even against their parents’ consent. 
MR. LEWIS: The filters can be tweaked so that, as I 
understand it, you can check it off saying that sex education sites 
are fine.171 
PROFESSOR REIDENBERG: I think we have run a little bit 
over.  We will have some announcements from our sponsor, from 
the IPLJ, and then we will conclude. 
I would just like to take a moment, though, to thank the panel 
for doing a wonderful job. 
MS. WARD:172 Good evening.  My name is Jaclyn Ward.  I am 
the Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media 
 
170 See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983); Carey v. 
Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977); Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging 
Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA J. CONST. L. 223 (1999)). 
171 See Am. Library Ass’n v. U.S., 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428–29 (2002) (describing 
N2H2’s filtering software and explaining that “[w]hen an exception category is enabled, 
access to any Web site or page via a URL associated with both a category and an 
exception, for example, both ‘Sex’ and ‘Education,’ will be allowed, even if the customer 
has enabled the product to otherwise block the category ‘Sex’”), prob. juris. noted, 123 S. 
Ct. 551 (2002). 
172 Jaclyn B. Ward, Editor-in-Chief, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media, and 
Entertainment Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law.  A.B., Harvard College, 
1999; J.D. expected, Fordham University School of Law, 2003. 
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and Entertainment Law Journal.  I am so pleased that you all were 
able to attend. 
Before you leave to enjoy cocktails and hors d’oeuvres, I 
would like to conclude by thanking today’s moderators and 
panelists for their thoughtful, and at times spirited, exchange of 
ideas. 
I would also like to thank all the members of the Journal for 
their support and their time, and I would like to thank our 
moderators, Professor Hugh Hansen and Professor Joel 
Reidenberg. 
I would also like to especially thank David Perry-Campf.  I 
would like to extend a special acknowledgement to our 
Symposium Editor, Kathy Bartlett.  We are really grateful to have 
her on our team.  I thank her for envisioning this event and for 
working so hard to ensure its success.  Thank you and enjoy the 
rest of the evening. 
